

Message Text

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S E C R E T USNATO 6289

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MPOL, NATO

SUBJECT: KEY ELEMENTS OF MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE

1. US DEFENSE ADVISOR (DR. LEGERE) AND DEPUTY DEFAD (B/GEN BOWMAN) MET WITH THE FRG DEFENSE ADVISOR (B/GEN SCHUNEMANN) ON 12 NOVEMBER TO DISCUSS MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE. AFTER CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION OF KEY ELEMENTS, SCHUNEMANN MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE FRG GENERAL PROBLEM WITH THE US PAPER IS THAT WITH FORCES AS THEY ARE TODAY, THE FRG BELIEVES THERE IS A GOOD CHANGE THAT THE CONVENTIONAL PAUSE OF A WAY IN THE CENTRAL REGION WOULD BE LESS THAN A WEEK IN DURATION. THE FRG WOULD LIKE TO CHANGE THIS SITUATION BY IMPROVING CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE BUT THEY FEEL STRONGLY THAT NATO SHOULD BE READY TO DEAL WITH THIS WORST CASE SITUATION. AT THE SAME TIME, HE AGREED WITH THE US PAPER THAT NATO SHOULD ALSO BE READY TO MEET AN ATTACK THAT OCCURS AFTER TWO OR THREE WEEKS OF MOBILIZATION.

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2. IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION, SCHUNEMANN ARGUED THAT A FEW WORDS SUCH AS "BALANCE" AND "PRIMARY DETERRENT" CAUSE THE FRG TO WITHHOLD SUPPORT FROM THE US POSITION. SCHUNEMANN BELIEVES THAT THE MEANINGS OF THE EQUIVALENT GERMAN WORDS

RESULT IN A DIFFERENT EMPHASIS. IN AN EFFORT TO SOLVE THIS LANGUAGE PROBLEM, MISSION RECOMMENDS SUPPORT OF THE FOLLOWING REVISED KEY ELEMENT ON "RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RESOURCES AND STRATEGY". MISSION HAS ALSO INCLUDED A FINAL SENTENCE WHICH WOULD TAKE THE PLACE OF THE SEPARATE US KEY ELEMENT ON INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS THROUGH COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS.

KEY ELEMENT: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RESOURCES AND STRATEGY

NATO DEFENSIVE STRENGTH SERVES THE DUAL PURPOSE OF FURNISHING A SECURE BASIS FROM WHICH TO NEGOTIATE AND PROVIDING A BAR TO AGGRESSION OR INTIMIDATION. REVIEW OF THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SITUATION AND OF MAJOR RELATED TRENDS FOR THE FUTURE LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT NATO WILL CONTINUE TO REQUIRE IN THE LONG TERM A CAPABILITY TO DETER AGGRESSION OR INTIMIDATION, AND IF DETERRENCE FAILS, TO DEFEND NATO TERRITORIES AND PEOPLES.

A. CONTINUED EMPHASIS ON CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF NATO'S CURRENT STRATEGY. THE PRIMARY AIM OF NATO'S AGREED STRATEGY AND MILITARY PLANNING IS TO DETER ALL FORMS OF MILITARY AGGRESSION. SUCH DETERRENCE REQUIRES THE MUTUALLY SUPPORTING TRIAD OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR, THEATER NUCLEAR, AND CONVENTIONAL FORCE CAPABILITIES. AS THE SOVIET UNION REACHES STRATEGIC PARITY WITH THE UNITED STATES, NATO MUST EMPHASIZE CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE DETERRENT AND TO INSURE AN EFFECTIVE FORWARD DEFENSE IF THE DETERRENT SHOULD FAIL. CONVENTIONAL FORCES OF THE ALLIANCE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED THE MAIN DETERRENT AND DEFENSE AGAINST PLAUSIBLE CONVENTIONAL ATTACKS, BACKED BY THE THEATER AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES OF THE ALLIANCE.

B. ATTAINMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF A PRECEPTIBLE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE WITH THE WARSAW PACT WITHIN PROJECTED RESOURCE LEVELS. NATO HAS FIELDDED A LARGE MILITARY FORCE OF HIGH QUALITY WHICH CONTAINS THE INGREDIENTS FOR A STALWART CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE AND CAN
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SERVE AS MORE THAN A SO-CALLED TRIPWIRE FOR NUCLEAR WAR. HOWEVER, THERE REMAIN OBJECTIVE DISPARITIES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES THAT PERMIT NO RELAXATION OF DEFENSE EFFORTS OR UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS OF FORCES. IF NATO NATIONS ADHERE TO FORCE IMPROVEMENT PRIORITIES AND GREATLY INCREASE COOPERATION, THEY CAN ATTAIN AND MAINTAIN A CONVINCING CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY TO BLOCK A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK. INCREASED COOPERATION MUST INCLUDE RATIONALIZATION OF DEFENSE TASKS, STANDARDIZATION OF EQUIPMENT, EXPANDED COMMON SUPPORT PROGRAMS (INCLUDING SUPPORTING SERVICES AND RESOURCES FROM THE CIVIL SECTOR), AND INCREASED FLEXIBILITY IN PLANNED USE OF NATO FORCES.
S.
PEREZ.

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